Posts tagged Atoosa
User Tampering in Reinforcement Learning Recommender Systems

This paper provides the first formalisation and empirical demonstration of a particular safety concern in reinforcement learning (RL)-based news and social media recommendation algorithms. This safety concern is what we call "user tampering" -- a phenomenon whereby an RL-based recommender system may manipulate a media user's opinions, preferences and beliefs via its recommendations as part of a policy to increase long-term user engagement.

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The Ethical Gravity Thesis: Marrian Levels and the Persistence of Bias in Automated Decision-making Systems

Computers are used to make decisions in an increasing number of domains. There is widespread agreement that some of these uses are ethically problematic. Far less clear is where ethical problems arise, and what might be done about them. This paper expands and defends the Ethical Gravity Thesis: ethical problems that arise at higher levels of analysis of an automated decision-making system are inherited by lower levels of analysis. Particular instantiations of systems can add new problems, but not ameliorate more general ones. We defend this thesis by adapting Marr’s famous 1982 framework for understanding information-processing systems. We show how this framework allows one to situate ethical problems at the appropriate level of abstraction, which in turn can be used to target appropriate interventions.

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Algorithmic and human decision making: for a double standard of transparency

Should decision-making algorithms be held to higher standards of transparency than human beings? The way we answer this question directly impacts what we demand from explainable algorithms, how we govern them via regulatory proposals, and how explainable algorithms may help resolve the social problems associated with decision making supported by artificial intelligence. Some argue that algorithms and humans should be held to the same standards of transparency and that a double standard of transparency is hardly justified. We give two arguments to the contrary and specify two kinds of situations for which higher standards of transparency are required from algorithmic decisions as compared to humans. Our arguments have direct implications on the demands from explainable algorithms in decision-making contexts such as automated transportation.

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