Posts tagged Foundations
Belief Revision For Growing Awareness

This paper is about how an agent should rationally update her probabilistic beliefs when her conceptual space (modelled as an algebra of propositions) grows. This is not like typical cases of learning, which are cases in which an agent comes to revise her beliefs for propositions about which she was already aware. We investigate whether the learning rules for the typical cases of learning can be extended to the case of conceptual growth.

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Why Time Discounting Should be Exponential: A Reply to Callender

Here HMI CI Katie Steele argues that on a certain way of modelling an agent's preferences and understanding her "time preferences", exponential time discounting is uniquely rational. However, if "time preferences" are understood differently, then exponential time discounting is not uniquely rational. This helps in understanding why the prescription of exponential time discounting has many defenders but also many detractors.

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Polychrony and the process view of computation

Some realistic models of neural spiking take into account spike timing, yet the practical relevance of spike timing is often unclear. I show that polychronous networks reflect a distinct organisational principle from notions of pluripotency, redundancy, or re-use, and argue that properly understanding this phenomenon requires a shift to a time-sensitive, process-based view of computation.

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Templeton World Charity Foundation Grant Awarded.

Colin Klein (ANU), Andrew Barron (Macquarie) and Marta Halina (Cambridge) have been awarded a grant to study "The major transitions in the evolution of cognition" from the Templeton World Charity Foundation. This $1M USD grant will fund research into the major shifts in computational organisation that allowed evolving brains to process information in new ways. Researchers at the ANU, led by CI Klein, will explore the philosophical foundations of computational neuroscience.

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Fully Expanding Moral Theories

This talk was given at a conference on Holly Smith’s book, Making Morality Work, held at Rutgers on October 18, 2019. I argued that Making Morality Work poses the problem that moral theories must be 'usable', but then offers a solution that only partly solves it. I offered a way to extend the solution, but argued that even that only partly solves the problem, and that we can’t stop there.

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